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EFFECT OF PRE-EXISTING LEGAL DUTIES UPON CON-

SIDERATION UNDER RESTATEMENT OF LAW
OF CONTRACT
In the infancy of his legal life the average American lawyer
has become familiar with a few legal principles which have been
given and accepted almost as unquestioningly as the so-called
laws of nature. One of these is tersely stated in Corpus Juris'
as follows:
"A promise to do what the promissor is already legally bound to
do cannot be a consideration, for if a person gets nothing in retuin for
his promise but that to which he is already entitled the consideration
is unreaL This obligation may arise from (1) the law independent of
contract, or it may arise from (2) a subsisting contract."

With all the perplexing qualifications and distinctions which
have descended upon most of our good old settled rules of law
in recent years, this is one rule which has, comparatively speaking, been allowed to rest in peace. The American courts have
not concerned themselves very much with the question of how
the party said to he already legally bound, became bound,
whether by previous contract or by positive law. If a party
was legally bound he Was legally bound and that was all there
was to it. To be bound by a pre-existing contract with a third
party was to be legally bound just as truly as by a rule of law.
In regard to the effect of a pre-existiilg contractual duty with a
third party upon consideration, Corpus Juris summarizes the
result of the American decisions as follows :2
"According to the weight of adthority In this country, a promise
to perform an existing contract with a third person or the performance
of It does not constitute a valuable consideration."

But now comes a force, too powerful to be ignored, to disturb the rest of this settled rule. In the "Restatement of the
Law of Contract" now being drafted by Professor Williston of
Harvard, for the American Law Institute, assisted. by Professor
Corbin of Yale and other eminent authorities, we find the somewhat surprising statement at Section 82(d):
113 Corpus Jurs, 351, 9 Cyc. 347.
2 13 C. . 356
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"Consideration is not rendered insufficient by the fact that the party
giving the consideration is then bound by a contractual duty to a third
person to perform the act or forbearance given or promised as consideration."

While the rile that pre-existing legal duties defeat consideration is not affected if the pre-existing duty arose out of
a rule of law or out of a former contract with the same party,
Section 82(d) distinguishes the cases in which the duty arose
out of a contract with a third party and in such cases attempts
to change our existing case law. That the draftsmeni of the
restatement are frankly seeking to work an innovation is shown
by their own statement in their commentaries. Referring to
Section 82(d) they say:
"Little or no judicial authority supports this distinction-Numerically, the cases holding the 6onsideration insufficient outweigh those
upholding it"

The question then arises as to whether a change in such a
well settled rule, of law is justified. Before entering into a discussion of the propriety of the change it will perhaps be worth
while to distinguish the essentially different types of cases which
have been treated as falling within the general rule first set out
and give examples of each. Attention can thereby be more easily
focussed upon the effect of the appli ation of Section 82(Cd) of
the restatement.
A leading case falling directly within the Section is
McDevitt v. Stokes,3 decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 1917. Since the facts of this case will be used repeatedly hereinafter for purposes of illustration, they will be set
forth in some detail. They were as follows:
A skilled race driver named McDevitt had entered into a
contract with a horse owner named Shaw to drive a well known
trotting mare called "Grace" in the celebf'ated Kentucky
Futurity race of the Kentucky Horse Breeder's Association alt
Lexington, in October, 1910. The purse offered provided for
the payment of $10,000 to the winner and $300 to the owner of
the dam of the winner. A corporation known as The Patchin
Wilkes Stock Farm, operating near Lexington, of which Colonel
W. E. D. Stokes held most of the stock, owned the dam of the
2 174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681, L. R. A. 1917D, 1000.
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mare Grace and Peter the Great, the sire, and also two full
brothers of the mare. Influenced by the fact that a certain portion of the purse would go directly to the owner of the dam and
by the more important consideration that the winning of the
Futurity: by the mare would enhance the reputation and value
of each of the other four horses owned by his corporation,.
Colonel Stokes promised to pay McDevitt $1,000 in the event of
his winning the Futurity with the mare Grace. McDevitt did
win the race with the mare, and brought suit for the unpaid
balance of $800.00 alleged to be due on account of Colonel
Stokes' promise. The defendant demurred and the demurer was
sustained. The plaintiff, refusing to plead further, took this
appeal. The Court' of Appeals affirmed the decision, Judge
.
the appellant
.
Settle having the following to say: "
because of his contract with Shaw, the owner of the mare 'Grace,'
was already both morally and legally bound to perform the services required of him by the alleged contract with the appellee."
Judge Settle in another part of the opinion also stated that
McDevitt was already "in duty bound to drive."
Without discussing for the time being the question of what
was intended to be meant by McDevitt's being "in duty bound"
or "morally and legally bound," or adverting to the sportmanship of a nationally famous sportsman in refusing to part with
the money which he had presumably promised to pay, it should
be said at this time that Judge Settle decided the case not only
in conformity with the established rule in America, but in conformity with the doctrine to which the Kentucky courts committed themselves as early as 1822. In the case of Fordv. Crenshaw,4 decided in that year, the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied recovery to a carpenter in a suit against an owner of a
building upon an express promise by the owner to pay because
the carpenter was already under a contractual duty to anothei
carpenter to help with the work before the defendant's promise
was made. The decision of McDevitt v. Stokes is more than in
accord with the authorities; it is typical of the orthodox mode ol
approach to the problem in that it unquestioningly assumes the
existence of an absolute pre-existing duty, which could not have
been legally extinguished before the time of the required per.
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formance. This as will be emphasized a little further along,
was assuming a good deal.
Having given an example of a case of the type affected by
Section 82(d) of the restatement and with which this discussion
is concerned, two other types of cases falling within the general
rule first set out will be exemplified and briefly commented upon.
First, that type of case in which the pre-existing duty
arises from some positive rule of law5 or out of the status of
the party concerned or by virtue of his official position or duty
to the public as an officer. Recovery is uniformly denied in
such cases. Examples are: where a mother sued upon a promise
to support her illegitimate child, 6 a finder upon a promise by the
rightful owner to pay him for the return of the chattel, 7 a jailer
upon a promise by a prisoner to pay him for attentions which it
was the jailer's duty as an officer to perform.8 Few people would
approve of compelling an unfortunate inmate of a jail to bargain
with the jailer for the necessities of life or approve of doing anything to establish a tipping system among public servants, or to
further irritate the palms of policemen. The result reached in
these cases seems very desirable but can be reached entirely on
the grounds of public policy. This was the view of Professor
Ames. He says:
"Promises given in consideration of the performance of official
duties or duties to the public are not enforceable. Public policy, rather
than the absence of consideration, it is submitted is the reason for
denying recovery in such promises."'

The rule of these cases is unaffected by Section 82(d) of the
restatement.
The second class of cases, which is sometimes confusingly
associated with the one to which McDevitt v. Stokes belongs is
the type in which the pre-existing duty arose out of a contract
with the promisor rather than with a third person. 10 For example, cases in which losing contractors, usually taking an unfair advantage, exact from the party for whom the work is being done a new promise to pay a larger sum for the work than
'For cases of this class see Am. Dig. II, 347 and 13 C. J. 351.
eCrowhurst v. Laverack, 8 Exch. 208.
YDe la 0 v. Pueblo, I N. M. 226.
'Trundle v. Riley, 56 Ky. 396 (17 B. Monroe).
'12 Harvard L. R. 519.
101q 0_ T_ .15..1-
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was originally contracted for. While certain doctrines dangerous in application, such as the doctrines of mutual rescission" ' "
and "unforeseen difficulties"' 2 have rendered a qualification of
categorical statement necessary, courts usually refuse to lend
their aid to the enforcement of such promises. Since it would
be very unwise for the courts to permit one party to a contract
to be subjected to the annoyance of the other party bringing
pressure to bear upon him to have the contract changed, the result reached in such cases seems practical and fair. This type
of case can also be disposed of upon the grounds of policy and
independently of any question of consideration.
The specifie problem of McDevitt v. Stokes, with which Section 82(d) is concerned, has been very much discussed' 3 in the
past, and those who have followed closely the articles upon the
question in the law journals will not be much surprised by this
change of the restatement.
The English courts have always allowed a recovery in such
cases. Professor Ames, who approved the English rule in his
article,' 4 thus summarize8 the English law upon the point:
"As early as 1616 It was decided In Bagge v. ,Slade, 3 Bulst. 162, that
an action would lie upon a promise, the only consideration of which
was the performance of a prior contract with a third party. Moore'v.
Bray, 1 Vin. 310, was a similar case decided the same way In 1633.
These early precedents seem to have been forgotten, but the question
involved In them arose In 1860 in the Common Pleas, in the Exchequer
in 1861, and In the Qeen's Bench In 1866, and in all three cases the
plaintiff was successful. Shadwefl v. Shadvell, 9 C. B. N. S. 159; Scotson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295; Chichester v. Cobb, 14 L. T. R. 333.
"One may safely assert, therefore, that by the law of England the
performance of a contract with a third party Is a consideration for a
new promise, while the majority of American decisions and dicta are
opposed to the doctrine of Shadwefl v. Shadwell, It is significant that
the latest decisions show a marked tendency toward the English rule.
Hume v. Decatur, 98 Ala. 461; Abbott v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433;Wilhe7m
v. Foss (Mich. 1898) 76 N. W. 308."

If Professor Ames supposed that the American states were
very rapidly drifting toward the English view, he would have

11Coyner v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282; Lingerfiel7d v. Wainright, 103 Mo.
578, 15 S. W. 844.
, King v. Duiuth, 61 Minn. 482; Dickinson v. Fowler, 114 Md. 344.
u Williston on Contracts, Vol. I, sec. 131; Pollock on Contracts, 8th
ed., 195; Corbin, 27 Yale L. Jr. 362; Ames, 12 Harv. L. P, 515; Beale, 17
Harv. L. R. 71.
1412 Harvard L. Rev. 519.
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been surprised at the decision of McDevitt v. Stokes in Kentucky
in 1917.
Professor Beale, writing in the Harvard Law Review16 evidences an approval of allowing recovery in cases similar to
McDevitt v. Stokes when, and only when, the new contract is
bilateral; that is, he would have allowed recovery only in the
event that MfDevitt had promised Colonel Stokes to drive; driving without having promised Colonel Stokes to do. so would not
be sufficient. This was Sir Fredrick Pollock's view, and was
approved by Dean Langdell of Harvard.1 8 Professor Williston,
however, tells us17 that for the most part no distinction is made
in the cases between bilateral and unilateral contracts as far as
this problem is concerned. Applying the principle to MoDevitt
v. Stokes, it would make no difference so far as the case law on
the point is concerned whether McDevitt promised Colonel
Stokes that he would drive the mare Grace, or simply went
ahead and drove the race after having been promised the $1,000
for so doing. Mfr. Williston states' s that there is only one reported decision' 8 which is an exception to this general statement.
It appears from what has been said that a very able group of
legal theorists in America have, with or without qualification,
preferred the English rule over the American rule and have
objected to classing cases of the type of McDevitt v. Stokes with
the other two confusingly similar types, which Professor Ames
tells us should be disposed of on the ground of public policy,
without regard to the question of consideration. Furthermore,
there have been a few American cases 20 following the English
rule.
The cases allowing recovery were so overshadowed by the
mass of contrary authority that the views of legal theorists
approving the English rule became pretty generally forgotten.
The question, however, was conspicuously reopened by Mr.
Justice Cardozo, of the New York Court of Appeals, in 1917, by
17 Harvard Law Review, 71.
Idem.
Williston on Contracts, Vol. I, see. 131.
'"See note 14.
" I mack, District of Columbia, 394.
2 Huime v. DecaturLand 6 Imnp. Oro., 98 Ala. 561, 13 So. 368; Hirsch
v. Chicago Carpet o., 82 Ill. 234; Donne y v. NQewho,
34 Md. 220; 50

Atl. 513; Abbott v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433, 40 N. E. 197.
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his decision in the case of DeCicco v. Schweizer.21 In this case
Judge Cardozo held that a promise by a father to pay an annuity
to his daughter in consideration of her marriage to a certain
nobleman, Count Gulinelli, was enforceable, in spite of the fact
that the daughter was already under a contract to marry the
count. Judge Cardozo claims to have rested his decision upon
the ground that the promise ran to both of the parties to the
pre-existing contract, rather than to only one of them, but the
real effect-of his decision was to break away from the majority
rule in America, for it has been clearly pointed out by Professor
Corbin that the daughter was the only real promisee, and the
count was incidentally a third party beneficiary.2 2 In this
opinion Judge Cardozo says:
"The courts of this state are committed to the view that a promise
by A to B to induce him not to break his contract with CO's void. We
have never held, however, that a like infirmity attaches to a promise
by A not merely to B, but to B and C to induce them not to rescind or
modify the contract they are free to abandon."

It looks very much as if Judge Cardozo did not approve of
the American rule and ingeniously seized on a vqry slight pretext in order to avoid being bound by it.
Not very long after the report of DeCicco v. Schweizer appeared, Professor Arthur L. Corbin of Yale wrote the article referred to in the Yale Law Journal 23 in which he took this decision as an occasion to reopen the war on the American rule
as applied to cases affected by Section 82(d) of the restatement.
The name of the article is "Does a Pre-existing Duty Defeat
With all respect to the able arguments for
Consideration."
the English rule made by the authorities mentioned above, it is
believed that the strongest argument which has ever been made
for allowing recovery in the type of cases affected by Section
82(d) of the restatement is stated in this article. While portions of it are a little difficult to read by those who are unfamiliar with the Hohfeldion terminology, his argument seems
irrefutable. Furthermore, one does not have to be overly suspicious to suspect that Professor Corbin's position as one of the
advisers to the draftsman of the restatement is largely responsible for the presence of Section 82(d). The remainder of this
2117 N. E. 807.
27 Yale L. Jr., 362.
=27 Ibid.
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discussion will, therefore, be taken up with and attempt to suggest in connection with the case of McDevitt v. Stokes the theory
of the argument for the provisions of Section 82(d) urged by
the man believed to be most responsible for it.
Since recovery is denied in these cases by the American
courts on the theory of a pre-existing duty to a third party, our
attention should be focussed upon the problem whether or not
this duty did in fact exist. Judge Settle tells us in MoDevitt v.
Stokes that McDevitt was "in duty bound" to drive the mare
before he dealt with Colonel Stokes. He does not tell us what
he meant by being "duty bound." The first step in the direction of a solution of this question is to determine what is meant
by a legal duty. Professor Corbin would determine this question solely in the light of what the courts would have compelled
McDevitt to do. If the organized agents of society, the courts,
would compel McDevitt to pay damages to Shaw for failing to
drive the mare, then Professor Corbin would say that McDevitt
was under a legal duty to drive the mare for Shaw and that
Shaw had a legal right that McDevitt drive. But since the time
had not arrived for McDevitt's performance, McDevitt was simply under a presumable or probable contingent duty to drive for
Shaw, and not under an instant duty to do so; certainly under
no absolute inextinguishable duty. (When the term "contingent
duty" is used, it is not meant that there was any such contingency as exists in cases where we are accustomed to say that
there is a condition precedent. All future rights and duties are
conditional in a certain sense; that is, they are conditional on
the passage of time with unchanged circumstances, and legal
duties normally spoken of as conditional are more conditional
than other future duties in that they are doubly or trebly conditional.) If, then, McDevitt was under any duty to drive the
mare at the time that he dealt with Colonel Stokes, the duty
should be properly described as a "presumable duty." It would
perhaps have ripened into an absolute instant duty to either
drive or pay damages; but in the meantime the contract between McDevitt and Shaw might have been voluntarily modified
or extinguished or abandoned.
Many important changes of circumstances may arise between the time that a horse owner engages a driver and the
time of the race. At the time the driver ip engaged the horse
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owner evidently feels that he will want the particular driver to
perform on the day of the race, but before the day of the race
the owner may have become so impressed with the ability of some
other driver that he would be not only willingly but anxious to
release the one first employed. If, then, the driver should have
reason for desiring to be elsewhere he could be released from the
duty presumptuously presumed to exist in the case of McDevitt
v. Stokes by merely offering rescission of the contract. A power,
certaily of more value than a peppercorn, would have been
given up in the case of McDevitt v. Stokes, had McDevitt promised Colonel Stokes to drive the mare at all events, and even
though McDevitt did not promise Colonel Stokes to drive the
mare at all events he might perhaps have forborne to exercise
his power to offer Shaw rescission in reliance upon Colonel
Stokes' promise to pay him the money.
It is the relinquishment of this power to offer rescision, a
legal power to create in the other party to the contract a power
to extinguish the pre-existing duty, or the forbearance to exercise this power, that Mr. Corbin emphasizes as the obvious consideration in this type of case. 2 4 Of course it may be said that
in many cases the power would be of little value because of the
poor chance of the offer of rescission being accepted, but stdch
an argument can only go to the adequacy of consideration and
does not deny its existence. The argument that such a power
offering rescission or modification or compromise has value may
sound a bit theoretical to some people, but will probably comniend itself to many office lawyers whose business it is to draft
a great many contracts. They will upon reflection realize that a
very large percentage of the contracts which they draw are
changed or modified or entirely rescinded by subs'quent writings
executed by themselves. Many prospective business deals result
in a whole series of contracts, each successive one extinguishing
some duties and rights and creating others. Looking at the
matter retrospectively, after a half dozen of such instruments
have been drawn, it would be absurd to say that at the time the
second or third contracts were in effect the parties were legally
bound in anything more than a presumable sense. The courts
have perhaps been too much influenced by the question of the degree of probability of the acceptance of the offer of rescission.
"27

Yale L. Jr., 362 at 371.
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Possibly Judge Cardozo was unconsciously influenced in this
manner when, in the case of De6ieco v. Schweizer, he distinguished the cases where the promise ran to both parties to the
first contract rather than to only one of them. It is more likely,
however, that Judge Cardozo was cleverly casting about for
some pretext by which to avoid being bound by a rule of law
which his mind refused to accept.
If there are persons to whom the argument that the power
of offering rescission is valuable still seems tenuous, possibly one
further illustration will help.
Suppose a famous jockey were under contract with a Mr.
Smith to ride in a certain race of average importance in New
Orleans, and that the jockey for some good reason was anxious
to get out of the contract and go north. Furthermore, let it be
supposed that he had not engaged himself to any horse owner for
the Kentucky Derby and that Mr. Smith was extremely anxious
to hire him for this race. Would not Mr. Smith's interest in
securing this jockey for the Derby and for, other races render
it not only possible but very probable that the jockey could get
out of the contract to ride in the New Orleans race upon very
easy terms. Yet, under the rule of such a case as McDevitt v.
Stoke7s, Colonel Stokes might appear upon the scene in New Orleans and induce this jockey to upset his plans and remain in
New Orleans upon a tempting promise, and then refuse to pay
with impunity.
Certainly the cases in which parties are allowed to break
their promises, solemnly made and relied upon by other persons, should be limited as much as possible. So long as we have
the doctrine of consideration there must of necessity be some
unavoidable injustice resulting from parties relying upon the
promises of other persons which are unsupported by considera-'
tion; but where there is so clearly a consideration such as we
have in these cases, it seems inexcusable to be driven to an unethical result because of a line of decisions which have misapplied a general rule, the reason for the existence of wleh was
apparently misconceived.
It may be well to emphasize that it is not here contended
that a contracting party has a legal power to breach a contract
and pay damages, the relinquishment of which should be a consideration. No party has any such power which he is privileged
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to exercise. Itis true that the courts in most cases can take no
ai.rmative action by way of punishing the contract breaker except by giving judgment for damages, but courts always have
refused to recognize the relinquishment of such an asset as a
consideratiOn for a new contract and should always continue to
do so.
While it remains to be seen how far courts are to be influenced by the restatement of the law by the American Law Institute, and it is too much to hope thit courts will all begin to reverse themselves on the strength of Section 82(d) as fast as the
problem arises, a step in the right direction has been taken and
the men who wrote the section are too big to be permanently ignored. To those to whom it seems more important to enforce
promises seriously made and relied upon than to adhere to a discredited rule, this section will commend itself.
CHATAIs RICE MCDOWELL
Wahbington and Leo University Law School.

